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RESUMEN
The environment in which military men, journalists and international and non governmental organiza-
tions’ (IO-NGO) personnel develop their work during a war or any armed conflict is already definitely
more complicate than in the immediate past. That is why for any of those actors is so important to
understand the mechanisms that explain how do the other relevant subjects behave in the front line and
the rearguard in order to adapt and improve their performances to that changing scenario. This work
focus on the specific relations established by journalists and IO and NGO press information officers.
The conclusions of this paper are the result of ground work and historic library research and are lin-
ked to the author’s historical based theory about external and internal factors regarding war corres-
pondents. 
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ABSTRACT 
El ambiente en el que militares, periodistas y personal de las organizaciones internacionales y no
gubernamentales desarrollan su trabajo durante una guerra u otro conflicto armado es ahora mismo
definitivamente más complejo que en el pasado inmediato. Por eso para cada uno de esos actores resul-
ta tan importante entender los mecanismos que explican el comportamiento de los otros sujetos, tanto
en el frente como en la retaguardia, dado que de esa forma podrán adaptar y mejorar su desempeño en
tan cambiante escenario. Este trabajo se centra en las relaciones específicas de los responsables de
prensa de las organizaciones internacionales y no gubernamentales con los periodistas. Las conclu-
siones de este artículo son el resultado del trabajo de campo y la investigación bibliográfica de tipo
histórico, al tiempo que se apoyan en la teoría de base histórica sobre los factores endógenos y exó-
genos del corresponsal de guerra desarrollada por el propio autor.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Just a couple of decades ago a war or an international crisis in the form of an
armed conflict was an exclusive matter of armies, journalists working with mains-
tream media and very few well known international organizations (IO), such as the
International Red Cross or the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.
But after the fall of Berlin’s Wall, the end of the Cold War and the consequent fre-
edom of movement before restricted because ideological reasons, but also the
1990’s technological revolution, all that old war and crisis scenarios have defini-
tely passed away. 
Today, and as far as the state has lost its old relevance in the international arena,
it’s more than possible to find not just regular armies, but also all kind of guerri-
llas, paramilitary groups and terrorists organizations in any so called war or, bet-
ter, armed conflict. Recently, the Balkans, West Africa, Central Asia and Latin
America has witnessed the increasing role of those irregular groups over traditio-
nal state armies in this new era armed conflicts1.
Beside those not regular armed groups and because that freedom of movement
and mainly the technological revolution linked to satellite television, digital came-
ras, Internet an so on, in now days crisis it’s very easy to find not just mainstream
media organizations’ journalists but also more and more professional and non pro-
fessional free lances and also what professor Philip Taylor calls “citizen journa-
lists”2. The same reasons explain the affluence of more and more IO and Non
Governmental Organizations (NGO) to those conflicts. 
So the environment in which all those subjects —military men, journalists and
NGO and IO personnel— develop their work during a war or any armed conflict is
definitely more complicate than in the very near past. That is why for any of those
actors is so important to understand the mechanisms that explain how do the other
relevant actors behave on the ground in order to adapt their performances to that
changing scenario. 
Already there is a deep knowledge and therefore an important bibliography
about the long relationship between military men and journalistic war correspon-
dents3. There are also some papers and even books, mainly official ones, about the
links between regular armies and IO and NGO personnel. However, there is a total
lack of information about the increasing and conflict after conflict more frequent
relationship between journalists and IO or NGO Press Information Officers (PIO).
In that sense, the aim of these academic paper is to make a general approach to that
very specific relation starting from the author’s own theory on External and Inter-
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nal Factors4 regarding front line war correspondent’s duties and rearguard journa-
lists’ activities. The facts and conclusions of this paper are also based on the author
TV journalistic ground and rearguard experiences5 and as well his time lecturing
future army, IO and NGO PIOs6. 
Thus this work would like to contribute to improve and enrich the performan-
ce of those IO and NGO PIOs dealing on a daily base with professional journalists
working as free lances or for mainstream media organizations, non professional
journalists and the so called “citizen journalists”. Actors of the front line or rear-
guard of any armed conflict that IO and NGO PIOs should know and understand
in deep.
2. JOURNALISM, HISTORY AND WAR CORRESPONDENTS
The first thing that many IO and NGO personnel should know is that journa-
lism, in contrast with armies and even IOs and NGOs, is a very unsteady, irregular
and disorganized activity. One that unfortunately not always runs according to pro-
fessional criteria. In one hand it’s possible to find very professional personnel, with
journalism university backgrounds and a deep knowledge of other people duties
involved in a war or an international crisis. But at the other hand it’s also possible
to find many intruders. Not proper journalists, say non professional free lances or
even worse, as Leeds University Professor Philip Taylor describe them, “citizen
journalists”. A normal citizen that takes a camera and acts as a journalist during a
conflict without the minimum academic and technical skills to do so. People that
never care about the risks and ethics that are involved in the daily activities of pro-
per journalists but also of those other personnel such as the ones working with an
international organization as a permanent or, as often happens, temporal and cir-
cumstance press information officers. 
Thus an NGO or IO PIO should try to guess out with whom is he or she working
and know the different approaches of journalists or media people. In that sense, the
best way to understand journalists covering a war or an international crisis is kno-
wing in deep the underground factors that are involved in that very specific work.
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4 See SAPAG MUÑOZ DE LA PEÑA, Pablo: “Desinformación exógena y endógena en la Guerra de
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6 The author is a staff professor at Madrid Complutense University where he lectures future war corres-
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Army officials as future PIOs at the Instituto Universitario General Gutiérrez Mellado. He is also a profes-
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Factors that are the result of war correspondents’ history7. In other words, what that
history of more than a century tells.
WAR CORRESPONDENT´S HISTORY
= + / - 
FIT TO THE WAR ON INFORMATION
CLASH OF FACTORS 1) EXTERNAL
2) INTERNAL
That History is the way in which journalists have fit —more or less— into the
war on information. That’s the parallel conflict fought by journalists, in one side,
and the information, propaganda and censorship departments of state armies, gue-
rrillas or paramilitary groups that participate in the main fight: the war itself or wha-
tever armed conflict. 
Reaching this point, it’s necessary to underline the fact that in general journalists
are more aware of the military men than other people involved in a conflict, such as
the personnel working for an IO or an NGO. In that sense public information offi-
cers (PIO) of any IO or NGO should be ready to recognize that on journalists eyes
they will just be a second or third source of information in order of importance.
They first prefer the military, then the civilians and finally the international organi-
zations or NGOs. It’s not fair but that’s the way it is, at least in general and to pre-
sent days. Thus, members of international organizations, will be forced to make
their information message more attractive because they first compete with the mili-
tary men, those who journalists use to privilege, and secondly with refugees and
other conflict victims, despite they are part of it and so an interested party and many
times another propaganda agent8. Even though many journalists use to forget that
because a combination of internal factors described bellow.
Going back to the History of war correspondents -the very one that allows us
to understand journalists’ behavior- it has been said that it shows how journalists
have fitted into the war on information along the years. A conflict that is no other
than a clash of factors. From a journalist point of view, those factors are external
and internal.
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+ ARMY CENSORSHIP/INFORMATION DEPT. 
(EXTERNAL FACTORS)
⇓
INFORMATION 
⇑
– MASS MEDIA /CORRESPONDENT 
(INTERNAL FACTORS)
3. EXTERNAL FACTORS
The external factors are those regarding to information, propaganda and cen-
sorship departments of the parties in conflict. In other words, censorship strategies
and tactics used to technically deal with journalists and their organizations. They are
external to journalists because even they should know them to adapt and tune their
work, they cannot change those factors related to censorship strategies and tactics.
That’s why they are external factors from a journalist point of view. They can know
them but not modify them.
In that sense journalists should know how the military deal with public informa-
tion, what strategies and tactics do they use so reporters can adapt at real time to
more or less censorship. The reason to adapt lays in the fact that not always, in fact
in general, media personnel have the resources to be everywhere at any time. So as
correspondents on the ground they have to decide where to go, and that is a very cri-
tical decision. In that sense, if they understand how censorship is working, as jour-
nalists they can take the better option, preserving their lives and the so often limi-
ted resources that they normally have to cover an armed conflict. In that sense and
in order to take the right decision., professional journalists have the following for-
mula to discover how the Censorship Bureau of any military organization —army,
guerrilla, paramilitary group, always in that order of importance— involved in a
conflict is dealing with information matters.
+ INFORMATION VALUE
=
+ CENSORSHIP
=
+ DIFFICULTIES TO THE 
CORRESPONDENT AND REARGUARD JOURNALISTS
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As journalists have learned along the years, frequently in a very painful manner,
censorship depends on the information value of any fact that happens on the ground.
If the information value is high, it seems very possible that the military will censor
it and in that sense a journalist will find more difficulties to do his o her job so at
the end, regarding the risks and the always limited resources that reporters normally
have, they will try to look for another news or fact to cover. That is the way it use
to be as far journalists are under permanent high pressure from their media organi-
zations, which demand a non stop feed of stories, unfortunately so often despite the
real information importance of those stories, many of them just anecdotic ones9.
When that happens, when journalists can not reach military sources or facts, the
very ones that they prefer, is the right time for IO and NGO PIOs to try to attract
journalists attention in order to insert their facts and points of views in the crowded
media agendas.
Saying that, it is very useful to understand what’s the information value of any
fact on the ground. In short, the final information value is the result of a simple sum
or addition. One between the military importance of any ground fact and the pro-
paganda importance of that same fact. Factors, however, that can also operate inde-
pendently.
FIELD MILITARY FACT
MILITARY IMPORTANCE
+
PROPAGANDA IMPORTANCE
=
> / < INFORMATION VALUE
In terms of practical and relevant cases, recent war in Iraq offers plenty of
them10. During the first days of April 2003 the U.S. Army launched its final assault
on the Iraqi Republican Guard Division protecting the capital Baghdad. But during
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9 For examples of those anecdotic stories that so often media organizations demand to their corres-
pondents on the ground, see SAPAG MUÑOZ DE LA PEÑA, Pablo: “Guerra contra el terrorismo. Guerra
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Irak y los medios de comunicación”, in Información, Producción y Creatividad en la Comunicación,
Madrid, Fundación General Universidad Complutense, 2004, pp. 257-271.
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the same days the first American APC vehicles entered the city and Saddam’s sta-
tue was pulled down from its pedestal. In military terms, what’s more important and
which one of the two situations is more relevant from a propagandistic point of
view? 
Definitely the first case is more relevant in military terms and the second one in
propaganda ones. In the first case censorship was high from the two sides. The
U.S.Army information and censorship apparatus did not want to expose a possible
military failure to journalists. Meanwhile, and because the same reasons, the Iraqis
also censored the access to the battle front. 
Regarding Saddam’s statue, the situation was different. For the U.S. information
apparatus it was very important to have as much journalists as possible to cover the
symbolic last moment of Saddam’s regime. So it was a situation with very high pro-
paganda value. Because they wanted to stretch that same regime as far as possible,
the Iraqi Ministry of Information, ruled by Mohamed Ali Al Sahaf, tried its best to
avoid journalists witnessing Saddam’s government final breath. Again but because
opposite reasons, for the Iraqis Saddam’s statue affair had a very high propaganda
value even in strictly military terms that same fact worth nothing.
During those days the conflict also offered the battle around Baghdad’s airport,
an operation with very high military and propaganda value. So, it wasn’t easy for
journalists to reach the airport in those days because the add of military and propa-
ganda value make things even more complicate to correspondents. In that case and
because those two reasons that add up in the information value, neither the Ameri-
can censorship nor the Iraqi one wanted not a single witness at Baghdad’s airport.
Many professional journalists think about the information value before taking
any relevant decision about where to go and what to cover during an armed conflict.
If a field military fact has a high military importance and also a high propaganda
negative importance it could be absolutely useless to try to cover that strictly situa-
ted on the place or the so called front line. It could be too risky and also a waste of
time and of the limited resources of media organizations. That was the case of
Baghdad’s airport battle.
Even the importance of doing so, some journalists never asses the information
value of a field military fact in order to guess the degree of censorship that they can
find. That’s because they still view their activity as a romantic and adventurous one
based on good or bad luck and intuition rather technical skills. History of war
correspondents is full of such people11. 
In that sense, people involved with an IO or NGO public information strategy
should use the same formula. If correspondents’ difficulties are very high, that’s the
specific moment in which they can sell properly any activity of their organization
that otherwise cannot easily reach journalists’ interest because they use to privilege
the military side of a war and specially the so called spectacular part of it. That is
more evident on TV war reports12.
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4. INTERNAL FACTORS
Beside the external factors regarding war correspondents and rearguard journa-
lists there are also some internal ones that an IO or NGO PIO should also know in
order to improve his or her performance dealing with journalists. These internal fac-
tors are very important because journalists can not just know them, as happens with
the external ones, they can also modify and manipulate them to improve their per-
formance on the field in journalistic and security terms. In other words, the internal
factors depend directly on them.
The first of these internal factors is journalists` own ideology commitment. This
is a big problem for them. A one that journalists couldn’t overcome along the years.
As a human being, a journalist has his own opinions about this and that. The very
professional ones can put aside those opinions, patriotism and their commitment
with themselves, also ways of non journalistic commitments13. However, many
journalists, even some professional ones, cannot do it. The result is a poor journa-
listic performance. As Philip Knightly underlines14 that was exactly what happened
during the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939) in which the writer Ernest Hemingway
was a case in point because his poor journalistic record as far he shaped his reports
according to his political opinions rather than what he was looking on the field. His
fault was such a big one that the North American News Association (NANA), for
which he was working, decided to suspend the relation with the writer. 
First Internal Factor
IDEOLOGY > JOURNALISM
COMMITMENT QUALITY
Public information officers must be very aware of the way in which journalists
manage with their own opinions, ideology, patriotism and the commitment with
themselves. That is why some PIOs, military or civilian ones, try to check that befo-
re offering any relevant information to journalists. If they don’t do so their organi-
zations could be in troubles because those so called “committed” journalists will use
the information that has been provide to them in their own ideological or personal
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you just follow headlines you will always be behind the news” El País, Madrid, September 29, 1999, p. 50. 
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interests, damaging the organization prestige and image. In that sense, the worse are
the ones that focus on a conflict from an emotional stand, using the simplicity of
good and bad, white and black. They tend to be the amateur journalists, of course
citizen journalists not withstanding.
The second internal factor regarding to a war correspondent is one that can be
described using Professor Marshall McLuhan communication theory. He says that
the media is the message. In other words, that the important thing is not the infor-
mation but the media itself. A newspaper, a radio station, a TV channel or an
Internet web site that places a journalist on the field just to say that they are in
place regardless of the information itself. In a few words, the media sells itself
more than real information based in facts or rigorous interpretation. That is
understandable as far as information is also a big business. The problem is when
it’s just that and nothing else. When the media is the message and the company
doesn’t leave any space to information then journalists’ work will have little or not
importance at all.
Second Internal Factor
McLUHAN > CORRESPONDENT & 
INFORMATION IMPORTANCE
(The Media is the message) 
Press officers working for an international organization must check out why a
journalist is in place. If he or she is there just to sell the media or to do something
else. In the first case they will not be interested in the information that an interna-
tional organization or NGO PIO can provide them or in their points of view about
this and that. In other words, PIOs must identify why that journalist is there becau-
se if they don’t do so press information officers could waste their time and their
message could be absorbed by the media is the message very common and exten-
ded attitude.
The third internal factor regarding a war correspondent performance is the rela-
tion between journalists and their editors, in theoretical terms, the rearguard of war
correspondents. In that sense it should be recognized by journalists and media orga-
nizations that many information get lost or don’t reach the public not because mili-
tary censorship but because a poor relationship between a journalist on the ground
and his editors and journalists mates on the rearguard, people as important as the
former in terms of dealing professionally with information matters. All that, and as
Carruthers underlines, despite many ground correspondents don’t want to see that
reality. “In reporting war, the procedures and decisions of those far from the ‘front
line’ may be as important as the actions of those correspondents who observe it first
hand (or as close as they are permitted to come) (...) Long before our ‘celebrity jour-
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nalism’war reporters have liked to portray themselves as exceptional individuals
operating in exceptional circumstances (...) But we should beware journalistic
mytographers. War correspondents belong to larger news organisations which dis-
cipline their work (...) But it should also be noted that much coverage of war is not
the work of war correspondents at all, just as most news reporting derives from
secondary sources, not first-hand observation. Reporting of distant conflict is often
based largely on agency reports and footage shoot by less glamorous (and less well
paid) local ‘stingers’in trouble-spots. Moreover, coverage of wars in which the
media’s own state is involved is likely to depend, in large part, on domestic elite
sources within the government and the military”15.
Third Internal Factor
EDITORS+REARGUARD v/s GROUND CORRESPONDENT
JOURNALISTS
=
POOR INFORMATION
Just a few journalists working as editors in the newsroom have performed befo-
re as ground war correspondents, so very often they really don’t value what their
correspondents have suffered to get an information. Many times they don’t publish
or broadcast the reports not because censorship but because ignorance or even envy,
a very common attitude in media organizations, especially on TV. History of war
reporterism is full of cases. 
Thus a press information officer working for an international organization can-
not believe that after talking to a journalist on the field his point of view or infor-
mation will pass through to be published. They must do a double work: talk to the
journalist on the field but also to the editors on the rearguard. Experience shows that
that is the only way to be sure that their information output will find a place in the
paper, the radio or TV agenda. 
The fourth and final internal factor linked to war correspondents and rearguard
journalists are their own academic and technical skills. As mentioned before, there
are many intruders in journalism. Risky people that can make big troubles for every-
body. They are more interested in the spectacularity of the war than in real infor-
mation. Some times they use international organizations’ public information offi-
Pablo Sapag Muñoz de la Peña External and internal factors regarding a war...
15 CARRUTHERS, Susan, L: op. cit. pp. 15-16.
230 Revista Historia y Comunicación Social
2005, 10, 221-232
cers to accomplish their goals, ones that have nothing to do with journalism or real
information.
Fourth Internal Factor
+ = +
ACADEMIC & WAR CORRESPONDENT/
TECHNICAL REARGUARD JOURNALIST
SKILLS
That’s why many PIOs take their time before delivering any information regar-
ding their organization. They try to check with whom they are dealing. In that sense
is a very good idea to build up a sort of journalists and media data base. Knowing
who is who, is easier to identify the professional ones and distrust the intruders,
those who use to say that anybody could be a journalist, that this is just a matter of
guts and courage and so on. In a word, run away from the adventurers and roman-
tics that attracts any war or armed conflict. People that can mislead the information
that PIOs provide them and that can also put under risk them and others. In that
sense it should be noticed the increasing number of journalists killed or wounded in
the last decade. Some, the professional ones, are aware of that and appreciate more
and more the academic and the technical preparation. In that sense, they are deman-
ding their companies more journalistic and security courses. Other journalists,
however, are stuck in the old fashion way of war journalism and run away from any
academic and technical preparation. They just trust in themselves, in luck, and ins-
tinct. As experience and war reporterism history show those are very risky journa-
lists for IO and NGO PIOs16.
5. CONCLUSIONS
The new nature of armed conflicts after the fall of Berlin’s Wall and the end of
the Cold War, and as well the technological possibilities of these days that have
eased the access to battle front and the possibilities to broadcast from there, make
more and more frequent the relationship between journalists and IO and NGO per-
sonnel. Anyway journalist’s characters have also changed so IO and NGO PIOs
must now know them in deep to avoid troubles in an increasingly complicated infor-
mation scenario. In that sense, the best way to deal with them is to have a compre-
hensive knowledge of journalists’ techniques and the way in which they operate
with other armed conflict actors.
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